国土安全部的记录史无前例的泄露暴露了为该部及其组成机构工作的41 000多名雇员或承包商的详细情况。 这些记录包括电子邮件地址、电话号码和办公室地址，但也提到内部系统以及关于卧底和监视程序的敏感信息。 总而言之，泄漏提供了人口与健康调查的组织方式及其运作方式的地图。
这些记录涵盖国土安全部本身以及包括移民和海关执法以及美国海关和边境保护在内的七个组成机构，最近一次更新是在2026年8月19日。 透明非盈利传播的否认秘密和网络安全研究员和记者maia纵火犯罪预览到WIRED，他们说他们从一个自称为和平部的团体那里获得这些数据。
DDoSecrets发布档案，它称之为"Icepick"，星期三。 在一份新闻稿中，DDoSecrets 称的数据来自DHS的Okta登录系统。 黑客们在一张带档案的纸条上写道，“他们有我们的信息，所以我们有他们的信息才公平。”
Okta 发言人告诉了WIRED，它不知道它的任何系统被破坏。 “我们了解这份报告。 Okta是安全的，我们没有数据或系统被泄露的证据，"发言人称。
并获得针对记者的监视工具的搜查令。 自第二届特朗普政府开始以来，DHS和联邦政府开始转移来隐藏DHS员工的姓名和面孔。 该机构还扩大了对 " 拒服兵役 " 的定义，这一术语通常指为恶意目的公布某人的家庭地址和其他个人细节，包括公布有关公职人员的基本事实，例如他们的姓名和头衔。
泄露事件发生在一起被称作"光辉猎人"的黑客集团声称窃取了几乎所有联邦调查局雇员及其家人的个人信息被破坏后。 执法机构逮捕了几名嫌疑人并拘留了另一名据称是该团伙成员的人。
人口与健康调查记录可在一个建立的犯罪网站中查找。 她告诉WIRED
DHS和司法部没有回应WIRED的征求意见请求。 联邦调查局将WIRED的调查交给了DHS.
根据WIRED对数据的分析，CBP工作人员占记录的一半以上。 ICE占了大约一万，其中大约三分之一是在ICE的调查部门国土安全调查中。 还有6 200人属于美国公民和移民服务局，近1 000人与网络安全和基础设施安全局有联系，其中一半以上是承包商。 这些档案总共覆盖了人口与健康调查的七分之一的劳动力，揭示了人口与健康调查的结构，从高级领导到个人移民agents和拘留承包商。
同大多数大型组织一样，根据被泄露的记录，DHS使用许可组来控制内部系统的访问。 几乎每个在泄漏中被点名的人至少可以访问其中一些系统。 HSI有十几个外地办事处的39名雇员属于“CUC”组织，另一群人，显然是以明尼苏达州圣保禄为基地，提到“Keyhole”，另一些人提到“通信拦截中心TechOps(CICTO)方案”，用于窃听的“Title III拦截方案”和“非法传感器拦截方案”。
这些团体的名字——总共有55,000多个——可以用来查阅移民法庭记录、取出被扣押电话的数据和进行监视的参考工具。 包括Palantir的"猎鹰"调查平台和分析电话记录和社交媒体的PenLink.
“行政领导”和“AI Access”这两个许可小组似乎列出在DHS的网络过滤器中存在例外的人员，该过滤器屏蔽了一些雇员的网站。 包括前国土安全部主任克丽丝蒂·诺埃姆(Kristi Noem)，最近卸任的国土安全部首席信息官安托万·麦科德(Antoine McCord)，回归国防技术公司安杜里尔(Anduril),Philip Hegseth，被列为国土安全部秘书的高级顾问和国防部长皮特·赫克塞特(Pete Hegseth)的弟弟；以及Jayce Krachenfels，被列为政策顾问，根据他的LinkedIn的简介，他以前曾担任过唐纳德·特朗普2024年总统竞选的地区战地主任。
漏出参考AI工具中被命名的其他组别，包括OpenAI的克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克克。 其中一名称为 " Grok.com "，包括8名DHS技术官员，包括该部前首席信息官员和首席数据官员。
称 Alexander Leslie，威胁情报公司的国家安全专家，“如果与以前受损的信息、商业数据和其他情报收集工作相关联，这一数据集就变得更有价值。 敌对方可以花几个月的时间来利用这些关系来确定易受伤害的人员，发展令人信服的冒名顶替企图，或破坏正在进行的调查。”
700多个账户与一个显然引用信号的团体有关，这个加密消息应用程序几乎都属于CBP人员。 超过200个CBP账户属于一个以Mobile Fortify为参考的团体，一个面相识别应用程序移民agents用于识别人员。 该小组包括外地主管、特别反应小组操作员以及战术和情报agents。 大约一半位于德克萨斯州，加利福尼亚州和亚利桑那州。
自2025年7月4日特朗普签署"一个大美丽的法案"后，大约创建了1300个ICE执行账户，该法案资助了2025年底前雇佣了10,000名新的ICE执行和清除官员。
近20个账户似乎属于国防部的人员，政府将国防部称之为战争部；8个账户属于一个名为“ICE Tip Line DOW Surge”的小组。 大约170个账户被列为在ICE设施提供“军事处理支助”，另有35个账户明确列出国民警卫队成员。
数十个账户有诸如“指定移民官员”和“287(g)官员”等职称，这标志着当地执法人员有权履行一些移民执法职责。 许多人将郡警长办公室和监狱列为他们的工作场所。 这些记录还包括大约4,400名“助理”，他们的工作范围从信息技术开发人员和数据科学家到护士和拘留官员。 其中145人被命名为“承包商”或“高风险承包商”。
300多份记录提到与国土安全部总部有关的高级职称，从Noem到副副部长、助理秘书和办公室主任，再到监督情报、技术、生物鉴别和隐私的官员。 大多数记录还指定了一名主管，这可以让分析数据集的人重建整个部门的报告关系。
特朗普政府因张贴个人ICE官员信息而起诉抗议者，并警告其他人这样做。 6月，明尼苏达州15名居民根据与跟踪和暴力威胁有关的法律受到指控，而检察官则将这些人参与ICE反对活动联系起来。 100多位HSI agents，包括卧底特工，参加了一次包括广泛监视和渗透团体聊天在内的行动。
特朗普政府以18 USC 119的扩展观点，禁止人们分享关于联邦官员或其家属的“限制个人信息”
称 Steinbaugh 包含在档案中的姓名和基本工作细节。 政府不能将此事定罪。
尽管被泄露出的数据中的其他记录有潜在的敏感性，但"冰挑"的创作者并不认为它是被打倒。 他们认为这是一个问责工具。
“特别是作为一个机构，人口与健康调查完全缺乏问责制，尽管其中的许多部分令人难以置信地不受欢迎。 当地工作的人也知道这一点，例如他们的一些LinkedIn Bios只是说“在美国政府里，“如果他们不掩盖自己参与美国政府的镇压部门，我们从一开始就没有必要揭露他们。”
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An unprecedented leak of Department of Homeland Security records has exposed details of more than 41,000 employees or contractors who work for the department and its constituent agencies. The records include email addresses, phone numbers, and office addresses, but also references to internal systems and sensitive information on undercover and surveillance programs. In all, the leak provides a map of how DHS is organized and how it operates.
The records, which span DHS itself as well as seven component agencies, including Immigration and Customs Enforcement and US Customs and Border Protection, were last updated on August 19, 2026. The transparency nonprofit Distributed Denial of Secrets and cybersecurity researcher and journalist maia arson crimew previewed the data to WIRED, which they say they obtained from a group calling itself the Department of Peace.
DDoSecrets published the archive, which it calls "Icepick," on Wednesday. In a press release, DDoSecrets says the data is from DHS's Okta login system. In a note with the files, the hackers wrote, “They have our information, so it's only fair that we have theirs.”
An Okta spokesperson tells WIRED that it is unaware of any breach of its systems. “We are aware of this report. Okta is secure, and we have no evidence our data or systems were compromised,” the spokesperson says.
The leak comes as DHS has aggressively pursued its critics, seeking to unmask anonymous social media users, obtain customer records on protestors, and secure warrants for surveillance tools aimed at reporters. Since the start of the second Trump administration, DHS and the federal government have moved to hide DHS employees’ names and faces. The agency has also expanded its definition of “doxing”—a term that typically refers to publishing someone’s home address and other personal details for malicious purposes—to encompass the publication of basic facts about public employees, like their names and titles.
The leak follows a breach in which a group of hackers known as ShinyHunters claimed to have stolen personal information on nearly every FBI employee and their families. Law enforcement agencies have arrested several suspects and detained another who is alleged to be part of the group.
The DHS records are searchable on a website crimew built. “I don't think we should let them scare us into not looking into them,” she tells WIRED.
DHS and DOJ did not respond to WIRED’s request for comment. The FBI referred WIRED’s inquiry to DHS.
According to a WIRED analysis of the data, CBP staffers account for more than half of the records. ICE accounts for about 10,000, roughly a third of them in Homeland Security Investigations, ICE’s investigative wing. Another 6,200 belong to US Citizenship and Immigration Services, and nearly 1,000 are tied to the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, more than half of them contractors. Altogether, the files cover about a seventh of DHS’s workforce, revealing how DHS is structured, from senior leadership down to individual immigration agents and detention contractors.
Like most large organizations, DHS uses permission groups to control access to internal systems, according to the leaked records. Nearly everyone named in the leak has access to at least some of these systems. At HSI, 39 employees across more than a dozen field offices belong to groups whose names include “CUC,” which government court filings say stands for “certified undercover operation.” Another group, apparently based in HSI's St. Paul, Minnesota area of operations, references "Keyhole," which federal court filings describe as a certified undercover operation that recently funded HSI's undercover surveillance of Minneapolis protest groups earlier this year. Others reference a “Communications Intercept Center TechOps (CICTO) Program,” a “Title III Intercept Program” for wiretaps, and an “Illicit Sensor Intercept Program (ISIP).”
The names of the groups—there are over 55,000 in all—appear to reference tools for accessing immigration court records, pulling data from seized phones, and conducting surveillance. These include Palantir’s Falcon investigative platform and PenLink, which analyzes phone records and social media.
Two permission groups, named “Executive Leadership” and “AI Access,” appear to list people given exceptions to DHS's web filter, which blocks some websites for employees. They contain the same 13 people, including former DHS head Kristi Noem; Antoine McCord, the recently departed DHS chief information officer who has returned to defense tech company Anduril; Philip Hegseth, listed as a senior advisor to the DHS secretary and the younger brother of defense secretary Pete Hegseth; and Jayce Krachenfels, listed as a policy adviser, who previously worked as a regional field director for Donald Trump’s 2024 presidential campaign, according to his LinkedIn profile.
Other groups named in the leak reference AI tools, including OpenAI’s ChatGPT, Google’s Gemini, and Microsoft’s Copilot. One, called “Grok.com,” includes eight DHS technology officials, including the department’s former chief information officer and chief data officer.
“If authentic and current, this is an extraordinarily valuable intelligence resource for those seeking to penetrate DHS,” says Alexander Leslie, a national security expert at the threat intelligence company Recorded Future. “This dataset becomes way more valuable when correlated with previously compromised information, commercial data, and other intelligence collections. An adversary could spend months exploiting these relationships to identify vulnerable personnel, develop convincing impersonation attempts, or compromise ongoing investigations.”
More than 700 accounts are associated with a group apparently referencing Signal, the encrypted messaging app, nearly all belonging to CBP personnel. More than 200 CBP accounts belong to a group referencing Mobile Fortify, a face recognition app immigration agents use to identify people. The group includes field supervisors, special response team operators, and tactical and intelligence agents. About half are in Texas, California, and Arizona.
Roughly 1,300 ICE enforcement accounts have been created since July 4, 2025, when Trump signed the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, which funded the hiring of 10,000 new ICE Enforcement and Removal officers by the end of 2025.
Nearly 20 accounts appear to belong to personnel with the Department of Defense, which the administration styles as the Department of War; eight are in a group titled “ICE Tip Line DOW Surge.” About 170 accounts are listed as providing “military processing support” at ICE facilities, and 35 others explicitly identify National Guard members.
Dozens of accounts have job titles like “Designated Immigration Officer” and “287(g) Officer,” which mark local law enforcement personnel authorized to carry out some immigration enforcement duties. Many list county sheriff's offices and jails as their workplaces. The records also include roughly 4,400 “associates,” whose jobs range from IT developers and data scientists to nurses and detention officers. Of those, 145 are named as a “contractor” or “high risk contractor.”
More than 300 records reference senior titles associated with DHS headquarters, from Noem down through deputy undersecretaries, assistant secretaries, and chiefs of staff to officials overseeing intelligence, technology, biometrics, and privacy. Most records also name a supervisor, which could allow anyone analyzing the dataset to reconstruct reporting relationships across the department.
The Trump administration has prosecuted protesters for posting information about individual ICE officers and warned others for doing so. In June, 15 Minnesota residents were charged under laws related to stalking and threats of violence, which prosecutors linked to their participation in ICE-opposition activities. More than 100 HSI agents, including undercover operatives, took part in an operation that included widespread surveillance and infiltration of group chats.
Adam Steinbaugh, a senior attorney at the nonprofit civil liberties group FIRE, says that the Trump administration has taken an expansive view of 18 USC 119, a law that prohibits people from sharing “restricted personal information” about federal officers or their families with the intent to threaten them.
"This is information that would be on a business card,” says Steinbaugh of the names and basic work details included in the archive. “That's not something the government can criminalize."
Despite the potential sensitivity of other records in the leaked data, the creators of Icepick do not consider it doxing. They see it as an accountability tool.
“The DHS especially as an agency completely lacks accountability, despite many parts of it being incredibly unpopular. The people who work there know this too, for example some of their LinkedIn bios simply say ‘stuff at US Government,’” says crimew. “If they weren't hiding their involvement in the repressive arm of the US government there would be no need for us to expose them in the first place.”
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